Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0911-6zbMath1341.91082OpenAlexW2281559537MaRDI QIDQ258926

Sabine Flamand, Pau Balart, Orestis Troumpounis

Publication date: 10 March 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/StrategicChoice.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Optimal lobbying pricing ⋮ Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members ⋮ Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter? ⋮ An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw ⋮ Non-deterministic group contest with private information ⋮ Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests

Cites Work

• Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking

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