Is majority consistency possible?
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Publication:258932
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0913-4zbMath1341.91053OpenAlexW1477857301MaRDI QIDQ258932
Publication date: 10 March 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0913-4
Related Items (2)
The socially acceptable scoring rule ⋮ Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
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