Is majority consistency possible?

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0913-4zbMath1341.91053OpenAlexW1477857301MaRDI QIDQ258932

Shmuel Nitzan, Eyal Baharad

Publication date: 10 March 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0913-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

The socially acceptable scoring rule ⋮ Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations

Cites Work

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