Learning by doing with spillovers: strategic complementarity versus strategic substitutability

DOI10.1016/j.automatica.2016.01.032zbMath1335.93020OpenAlexW2509319974MaRDI QIDQ259471

Fouad El Ouardighi, Konstantin Kogan, Tatyana Chernonog

Publication date: 11 March 2016

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2016.01.032

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamesduopolylearning by doingconsistent conjectures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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Cites Work

• Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
• Research and development with stock-dependent spillovers and price competition in a duopoly
• Dynamic R\&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation
• Optimal Control of Nonlinear Processes
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
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