First mover advantage in launch of platform based variants: a leader-follower game with upper bound on prices

DOI10.1007/S12597-014-0174-5zbMath1332.91036OpenAlexW1972858719MaRDI QIDQ260483

Kashi N. Singh, Atanu Chaudhuri

Publication date: 21 March 2016

Published in: Opsearch (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12597-014-0174-5

zbMATH Keywords

pricingchoice of product linestatic and dynamic gamesupper bound on prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
• Augmenting Conjoint Analysis to Estimate Consumer Reservation Price
• Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Competitive Pricing by a Price Leader
• Various strategies to handle cannibalization in a competitive duopolistic market

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