First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1027-yzbMath1392.91096OpenAlexW3123120905MaRDI QIDQ2628712

Aner Sela, Reut Megidish, Alex Krumer

Publication date: 2 June 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1509.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

first-mover advantageround-robin tournamentssubgame perfection equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (11)

Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players ⋮ Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments ⋮ League competitions and fairness ⋮ A simulation comparison of tournament designs for the World Men's Handball Championships ⋮ Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments ⋮ Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence ⋮ Optimal seedings in interdependent contests ⋮ Tournament schedules and incentives in a double round‐robin tournament with four teams ⋮ Fair elimination-type competitions ⋮ Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes ⋮ Round-robin tournaments with limited resources

Cites Work

• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• TOURNAMENTS AND PAIRED COMPARISONS
• A comparison of the effectiveness of tournaments
• On the Probability of Winning with Different Tournament Procedures

This page was built for publication: First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments