Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
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Publication:2628714
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1031-2zbMath1392.91057OpenAlexW2588353697MaRDI QIDQ2628714
Publication date: 2 June 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107673
Related Items (3)
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes ⋮ Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
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