The Condorcet paradox revisited
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Publication:2629515
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0950-7zbMath1403.91131OpenAlexW3125342263WikidataQ59463370 ScholiaQ59463370MaRDI QIDQ2629515
Harold Houba, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 6 July 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0950-7
Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
Related Items (5)
Costless delay in negotiations ⋮ A bargaining experiment with asymmetric institutions and preferences ⋮ Backward induction and unacceptable offers ⋮ Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria ⋮ Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
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