Incompleteness of intuitionistic propositional logic with respect to proof-theoretic semantics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2631650
DOI10.1007/s11225-018-9823-7OpenAlexW2888307280MaRDI QIDQ2631650
Peter Schroeder-Heister, Thomas Piecha
Publication date: 15 May 2019
Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9823-7
Kripke semanticsintuitionistic logicincompletenessproof-theoretic semanticslogical constantsgeneral proof theoryPrawitz's conjecture
Related Items (6)
General proof theory: introduction ⋮ Calculi of epistemic grounding based on Prawitz's theory of grounds ⋮ Negative predication and distinctness ⋮ Natural deduction bottom up ⋮ Proof-theoretic semantics and inquisitive logic ⋮ Denotational semantics for languages of epistemic grounding based on Prawitz's theory of grounds
Cites Work
- Advances in proof-theoretic semantics
- Failure of completeness in proof-theoretic semantics
- On the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic
- Concerning formulas of the types A→B ν C,A →(Ex)B(x) in intuitionistic formal systems
- An Approach to General Proof Theory and a Conjecture of a Kind of Completeness of Intuitionistic Logic Revisited
- On Dummett’s “Proof-Theoretic Justifications of Logical Laws”
- Completeness in Proof-Theoretic Semantics
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
This page was built for publication: Incompleteness of intuitionistic propositional logic with respect to proof-theoretic semantics