A comment on ``Towards a rigorous framework for studying 2-player continuous games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.035zbMath1411.91014OpenAlexW1975252309WikidataQ51200500 ScholiaQ51200500MaRDI QIDQ2632171

Christoph Hauert, Michael Doebeli, Timothy P. Killingback

Publication date: 14 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.035

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Measure dynamics on a one-dimensional continuous trait space: theoretical foundations for adaptive dynamics
• CHAOS IN COOPERATION: CONTINUOUS-VALUED PRISONER’S DILEMMAS IN INFINITE-VALUED LOGIC

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