A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments

DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9676-6zbMath1411.91216OpenAlexW2899782063MaRDI QIDQ2633439

Weibin Han, Adrian Van Deemen

Publication date: 8 May 2019

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9676-6

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityuncovered setunsurpassed setCopeland winner set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20)

Related Items (4)

Individual choice under social influence ⋮ Query complexity of tournament solutions ⋮ The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions

Cites Work

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• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality

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