Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
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Publication:263383
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.012zbMath1347.91069OpenAlexW3122260256MaRDI QIDQ263383
Jonathan Woon, William Minozzi
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.012
bounded rationalitybehavioral modelslaboratory experimentlevel-\(k\)multiple senderssender-receiver gamesstrategic information transmission
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (3)
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