Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.001zbMath1347.91177OpenAlexW2285690960MaRDI QIDQ263391

Lucas Maestri, Daniel Gottlieb, Renato Gomes

Publication date: 5 April 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102229/1/bandit_mech_design_16_01_28.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionexperimentationbandit problementrepreneurshipmulti-dimensional screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development ⋮ Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production

Cites Work

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