Joint games and compatibility

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0zbMath1367.91022OpenAlexW2221798450MaRDI QIDQ2634137

Hirbod Assa, Sheridon Elliston, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 8 February 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamescorecompatibilityconcave integraljoint game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ On benefits of cooperation under strategic power ⋮ Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: a set-valued games approach ⋮ Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities

Cites Work

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• Cores of combined games
• The concave integral over large spaces
• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• A new integral for capacities
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
• A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities
• Decomposition-integral: unifying Choquet and the concave integrals
• Theory of capacities

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