Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: a characterization of the plurality with a runoff

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003zbMath1347.91135OpenAlexW2173815453MaRDI QIDQ2634478

Shin Sato

Publication date: 9 February 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Combinatorics of Election Scores

Cites Work

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• Informational requirements of social choice rules
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate