Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.01.011zbMath1281.91010OpenAlexW2045636492MaRDI QIDQ2636776

Javier Rivas

Publication date: 18 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.011

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationprisoner's dilemmaimitationpartial rematching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (6)

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Experiments on individual strategy updating in iterated snowdrift game under random rematching ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior ⋮ Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation ⋮ Matching markets and cultural selection

Cites Work

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• The evolution of cooperation through imitation
• Cooperation in viscous populations-experimental evidence
• Nonlinear systems. Analysis, stability, and control
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Optimal properties of stimulus-response learning models.
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment
• The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
• Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
• Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules

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