The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.002zbMath1280.91082OpenAlexW2139103024MaRDI QIDQ2637849

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 14 February 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22462/1/CLY2013.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerresaleperfect Bayesian equilibriumsecond-price auctionasymmetric biddersoriginal seller's expected revenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Equilibrium and welfare analysis in second-price auctions with resale and costly entry

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
• Auctions with resale and bargaining power
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Auctions with entry
• Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• First price auctions with resale
• Optimal auction with resale -- a characterization of the conditions
• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auction with Resale

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