Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
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Publication:2637851
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.005zbMath1280.91124OpenAlexW2084635811MaRDI QIDQ2637851
Publication date: 14 February 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.005
Related Items (9)
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application ⋮ New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ New axioms for immediate acceptance ⋮ The modified Boston mechanism
Cites Work
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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