Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
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Publication:2638913
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90146-UzbMath0717.90021MaRDI QIDQ2638913
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (19)
Surplus dissipating equilibria in the dollar auction ⋮ Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions ⋮ Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals ⋮ R&D competition and the persistence of technology leadership ⋮ Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints ⋮ Resource inequality in the war of attrition ⋮ Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs ⋮ On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints ⋮ A model of a two-stage all-pay auction ⋮ Contests with limited resources ⋮ Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts ⋮ The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information ⋮ The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information ⋮ All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study ⋮ Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Preemptive patenting under uncertainty and asymmetric information ⋮ A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels ⋮ Multi-battle contests ⋮ Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
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