Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF01755476zbMath0718.90103OpenAlexW2057658651MaRDI QIDQ2639784

Larry Samuelson, Kalyan Chatterjee

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01755476

zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibriaNash demand gamesplit-the-difference tradeuniversal perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result ⋮ Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example ⋮ Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing ⋮ Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games ⋮ A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game ⋮ Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator ⋮ Strategic choice of waiting and reaction times in bargaining

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