Equilibria in open common value auctions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90144-SzbMath0719.90024OpenAlexW2091627599MaRDI QIDQ2640431

Sushil Bikhchandani, John G. Riley

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90144-s

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenessNash equilibriumcontinuum of equilibriasecond-price, common value auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (35)

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions ⋮ Equilibria in open common value auctions ⋮ Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction ⋮ Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ AUCTIONS FOR CHARITY: THE CURSE OF THE FAMILIAR ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. ⋮ Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions ⋮ All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions ⋮ Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation ⋮ Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price ⋮ Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions ⋮ Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions ⋮ An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values ⋮ Successful uninformed bidding ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment ⋮ Optimality and robustness of the English auction ⋮ The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions ⋮ The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions ⋮ EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK ⋮ Coordination in auctions with entry ⋮ On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information

Cites Work

• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Ex Post Information in Auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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