Credible coalitions and the core

DOI10.1007/BF01268157zbMath0719.90099MaRDI QIDQ2640466

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

credibilityblocking coalitionscredible coalitionmodified core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (33)

The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets ⋮ STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION ⋮ Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty ⋮ Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players ⋮ Equilibrium binding agreements ⋮ Stability in dynamic matching markets ⋮ Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games ⋮ The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set ⋮ Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ A consistent bargaining set ⋮ Stochastic bankruptcy games ⋮ The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ On stability of economic networks ⋮ On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. ⋮ Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities. ⋮ Coalition formation as a dynamic process. ⋮ Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games ⋮ An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games ⋮ Transferable utility games with uncertainty ⋮ The partnered core of a game with side payments ⋮ CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES ⋮ Coalitions, agreements and efficiency ⋮ A NOTE ON THE WEAK SEQUENTIAL CORE OF DYNAMIC TU GAMES ⋮ The unbinding core for coalitional form games ⋮ The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty ⋮ The weak sequential core for two-period economies ⋮ Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems ⋮ General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ⋮ A theory of endogenous coalition structures ⋮ Far-sightedness and the voting paradox ⋮ Deviations, uncertainty and the core

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• A consistent bargaining set
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints

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