Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting

DOI10.1007/BF00134122zbMath0721.90005OpenAlexW2094374083WikidataQ57341010 ScholiaQ57341010MaRDI QIDQ2641197

Nicolaus Tideman, Georges Bordes

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134122

zbMATH Keywords

social choicechoice consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The multiplicative representation for multiple objectives optimization with an application for arms procurement, The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives, Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited, A rote on impossibility theorems and seniority rules, Weak independence and veto power.

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