Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
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Publication:2641198
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(91)90017-NzbMath0721.90006MaRDI QIDQ2641198
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
- Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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