Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games

DOI10.1007/BF00182448zbMath0721.90009OpenAlexW2015322413MaRDI QIDQ2641200

Tilman Börgers

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00182448

zbMATH Keywords

collective decision makingcompromisePareto-efficient

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Efficient compromising ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Compromising as an equal loss principle ⋮ The robustness of robust implementation ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

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