Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
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Publication:2641228
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90039-MzbMath0721.90083OpenAlexW2085120382MaRDI QIDQ2641228
Philip J. Reny, Wolfgang Leininger, Arthur J. Robson, Martin F. Hellwig
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90039-m
perfect informationsubgame-perfect equilibriumsubgame consistencyfinite-action approximationsinfinite-action continuous games
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- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
- Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
- Consistent Plans
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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