Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.04.014zbMath1178.91050OpenAlexW2000274407MaRDI QIDQ2641999

Ton Storcken, Stefan Maus, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 20 August 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/de37b66e-af8a-4df1-83ae-295e42669c7e

zbMATH Keywords

unanimityminimal manipulabilitysocial choice functionsnondictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity ⋮ Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules ⋮ Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions ⋮ Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour ⋮ Dictatorship versus manipulability

Cites Work

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• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• Interjacency
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
• Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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