Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
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Publication:2641999
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.04.014zbMath1178.91050OpenAlexW2000274407MaRDI QIDQ2641999
Ton Storcken, Stefan Maus, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 20 August 2007
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/de37b66e-af8a-4df1-83ae-295e42669c7e
Related Items (6)
Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity ⋮ Gains from manipulating social choice rules ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules ⋮ Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions ⋮ Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour ⋮ Dictatorship versus manipulability
Cites Work
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- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- Interjacency
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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