The limits of epistemic democracy

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0185-0zbMath1180.91251OpenAlexW2151642490MaRDI QIDQ2642554

van Hees, Martin

Publication date: 17 August 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0185-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (16)

A generalised model of judgment aggregation ⋮ Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic ⋮ The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory ⋮ Belief merging and judgment aggregation in fuzzy setting ⋮ Aggregation of non-binary evaluations ⋮ Neutrality and relative acceptability in judgment aggregation ⋮ Judgment aggregation without full rationality ⋮ Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case ⋮ A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation ⋮ Which worlds are possible? A judgment aggregation problem ⋮ Introduction to judgment aggregation ⋮ Majority voting on restricted domains ⋮ The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation ⋮ The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications ⋮ The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation ⋮ An application of Peircean triadic logic: modelling vagueness

Cites Work

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• Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
• The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions
• Logical constraints on judgement aggregation
• Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
• Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems

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