Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

DOI10.1007/S10683-006-9132-2zbMath1161.91378OpenAlexW2151401858MaRDI QIDQ2642608

Sigrid Suetens, Jan Potters

Publication date: 17 August 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9132-2

zbMATH Keywords

CollusionQuantity-choice and price-choice experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Cooperation and strategic complementarity: an experiment with two voluntary contribution mechanism games with interior equilibria ⋮ Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation ⋮ Competition and innovation: An experimental investigation ⋮ The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment ⋮ Framing and repeated competition ⋮ The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games ⋮ Retail channel management decisions under collusion ⋮ Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games ⋮ Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

Cites Work

• Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Unnamed Item

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