Analysis on the forward market equilibrium model

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2006.01.006zbMath1306.91066OpenAlexW2027555061MaRDI QIDQ2643822

Che-Lin Su

Publication date: 27 August 2007

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraintsmulti-leader-follower gamesasymmetric producersforward market equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites Work

• Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency
• Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games
• Mathematical Programs with Complementarity Constraints: Stationarity, Optimality, and Sensitivity
• A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
• A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations