Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.07.007zbMath1195.91088OpenAlexW2100191518MaRDI QIDQ2653921

David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 15 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686412

zbMATH Keywords

self-confirming equilibriumLucas critiquesuperstitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (4)

A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies ⋮ Macroeconomic uncertainty prices when beliefs are tenuous ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium

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• Neo-Keynesian Disequilibrium Theory in a Monetary Economy
• Escaping Nash Inflation
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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