Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2008.03.003zbMath1181.91203OpenAlexW3123750910MaRDI QIDQ2654422

Olivier Loisel

Publication date: 19 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/working-paper_127_2005.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

monetary policyreputationinflation biastimeless perspectivestabilization bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (4)

The signaling effect of raising inflation ⋮ A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies ⋮ Credible forward guidance ⋮ On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal monetary policy in a micro-founded model with parameter uncertainty
• Sustainable monetary policies
• Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing
• MONETARY POLICY OVER TIME

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