Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location
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Publication:2659777
DOI10.1007/s00453-020-00771-xOpenAlexW3089975844MaRDI QIDQ2659777
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Publication date: 26 March 2021
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-020-00771-x
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