On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands

DOI10.1007/s10878-014-9817-yzbMath1341.91101arXiv1210.0203OpenAlexW2075022665MaRDI QIDQ266046

Paul W. Goldberg, Xiaotie Deng, Ning Chen, Jinshan Zhang

Publication date: 13 April 2016

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.0203

zbMATH Keywords

envy-freecompetitive equilibriumposition auctionrevenue maximizationsharp demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items

Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare, Unnamed Item, Approximating the revenue maximization problem with sharp demands, On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets

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