How to bid in unified second-price auctions when requests are duplicated

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2020.05.010zbMath1482.91098OpenAlexW3026294097MaRDI QIDQ2661498

Benjamin Heymann

Publication date: 7 April 2021

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2020.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designoptimal bidding strategyad exchangerandomized bidunified second-price auction with duplicated requests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Maximizing revenue for publishers using header bidding and ad exchange auctions

Cites Work

• On Information Structures, Feedback and Causality
• Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

This page was built for publication: How to bid in unified second-price auctions when requests are duplicated