Strategic behavior in queues with the effect of the number of customers behind

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2020.08.003zbMath1478.90028OpenAlexW3080829248MaRDI QIDQ2661538

Sheng Zhu, Lei Fang, Zhongbin Wang

Publication date: 7 April 2021

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2020.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium analysistransparencystrategic behavioreffect of number behind

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (1)

To incentivize the fast server or not? Firm's dilemma when queue signals service rate in high-contact services

Cites Work

• The psychological cost of waiting
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• A Psychological Perspective on Service Segmentation Models: The Significance of Accounting for Consumers’ Perceptions of Waiting and Service
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
• A model for rational abandonments from invisible queues

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