Maximizing revenue for publishers using header bidding and ad exchange auctions

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2021.01.008OpenAlexW3123573640MaRDI QIDQ2661631

Reza Refaei Afshar, Uzay Kaymak, Muratcan Tanyerli, Alp Akcay, Jason Rhuggenaath, Ying-Qian Zhang, Fatih Çolak

Publication date: 7 April 2021

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

auctionspricingmachine learningmulti-armed banditsfloor priceheader bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (1)

Bundling Decisions for Selling Multiple Items in Online Auctions

Cites Work

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• Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms
• Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem

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