Optimizing the cost of preference manipulation in the graph model for conflict resolution

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2020.125729OpenAlexW3094339933MaRDI QIDQ2662568

Leandro C. Rêgo, Hugo Victor Silva, Carlos Diego Rodrigues

Publication date: 14 April 2021

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125729

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexityminimum costoptimal incentivesconflict interventioninverse GMCR

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of graph theory (05C90)

Related Items (1)

Solving the inverse graph model for conflict resolution using a hybrid metaheuristic algorithm

Cites Work

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• Matrix representations of the inverse problem in the graph model for conflict resolution
• Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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