Average payoff-driven or imitation? A new evidence from evolutionary game theory in finite populations
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Publication:2662628
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2020.125784OpenAlexW3110593216MaRDI QIDQ2662628
Lijun Hong, Chen Shen, Lei Shi, Yini Geng, Chunpeng Du
Publication date: 14 April 2021
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125784
Related Items (3)
The slow but persistent self-improvement boosts group cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary cooperation dynamics of combining imitation and super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating ⋮ Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating promotes cooperation in the asymmetric prisoner's dilemma game
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