A minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory

DOI10.1007/s11238-015-9505-0zbMath1378.91060OpenAlexW265457890MaRDI QIDQ266503

Kenneth G. Binmore

Publication date: 13 April 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9505-0

zbMATH Keywords

non-expected utilityexpected utilityBayesian decision theoryalpha-maximinHurwicz criterionupper and lower probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (2)

Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds ⋮ Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions

Cites Work

• Two views of belief: Belief as generalized probability and belief as evidence
• Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
• A model of set-theory in which every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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