Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.07.012zbMath1478.91061OpenAlexW3195888632MaRDI QIDQ2667243

Michelle R. Garfinkel, Constantinos Syropoulos

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.012

zbMATH Keywords

destructive warsdisputesoutput insecuritypeaceful settlementunarmed peace

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
• Contest success functions
• Inequality and conflict: burning resources to support peace
• Peace agreements without commitment

This page was built for publication: Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo