Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
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Publication:2667259
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.013zbMath1478.91075OpenAlexW3198288619MaRDI QIDQ2667259
Bertrand Tchantcho, Roland Pongou
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10393/42741
truthful equilibriapsychologyeffective powerhyper-preferencespolitical designranked votinground-robin political tournaments
Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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