The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games
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Publication:2667261
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.010zbMath1478.91047OpenAlexW3198116483MaRDI QIDQ2667261
Jeongbin Kim, Guillaume R. Fréchette, Pedro Dal Bó
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.brown.edu/sites/g/files/dprerj726/files/papers/Bravo%20Working%20Paper%202020-017.pdf
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