(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Publication:2667262
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.011zbMath1478.91087arXiv1604.04876OpenAlexW3197632327MaRDI QIDQ2667262
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.04876
Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (6)
Cost sharing in two-sided markets ⋮ Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets ⋮ Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best ⋮ Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games ⋮ Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms ⋮ Improved approximation to first-best gains-from-trade
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