Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.09.002zbMath1478.91024OpenAlexW3201012618MaRDI QIDQ2667264

Mike Felgenhauer

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionexperimentationmanipulationpersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Optimal Level of Experimentation
• Torture and the Commitment Problem
• THE FACE VALUE OF ARGUMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT MANIPULATION
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
• Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions

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