General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis
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Publication:2667284
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.010zbMath1475.91052arXiv1211.3043OpenAlexW3207117583MaRDI QIDQ2667284
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior, Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.3043
convex analysismechanism designproper scoring rulesnon-convex setsinformation elicitationimplementability characterizationsproperty elicitationtruthful elicitation
Related Items (7)
Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments ⋮ Power diagram detection with applications to information elicitation ⋮ The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ An Axiomatic Study of Scoring Rule Markets ⋮ The Complexity of Partial Function Extension for Coverage Functions ⋮ Scoring interval forecasts: equal-tailed, shortest, and modal interval ⋮ Forecast evaluation of quantiles, prediction intervals, and other set-valued functionals
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