An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
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Publication:2667570
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01326-xzbMath1485.91084OpenAlexW3175624739MaRDI QIDQ2667570
Christian Stricker, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
Publication date: 4 March 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01326-x
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Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
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