Bilaterally-agree partner switching promotes cooperation in social dilemmas

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2021.126452OpenAlexW3199744068MaRDI QIDQ2667736

Hao Sun, Gen-Jiu Xu, Yimei Yang

Publication date: 1 March 2022

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2021.126452

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary prisoner's dilemma gamepartner switchingbilateral consultation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (1)

Heterogeneous negotiation undermines cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
• Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
• The Bargaining Problem
• Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
• Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
• Sociophysics Approach to Epidemics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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