Diffusion auction design

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2021.103631OpenAlexW3212145378MaRDI QIDQ2667812

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 2 March 2022

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103631

zbMATH Keywords

social networkauctionmechanism designinformation diffusionrevenue optimization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Cites Work

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