Fair allocation of indivisible goods: beyond additive valuations
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Publication:2667816
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2021.103633OpenAlexW3211709020MaRDI QIDQ2667816
Masoud Seddighin, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Ghodsi, Saeed Seddighin, Hadi Yami
Publication date: 2 March 2022
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103633
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