Complexity results for preference aggregation over \((m)\)CP-nets: max and rank voting
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Publication:2667819
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2021.103636OpenAlexW3215860776MaRDI QIDQ2667819
Enrico Malizia, Thomas Lukasiewicz
Publication date: 2 March 2022
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103636
computational complexityvotingpreferencespolynomial hierarchypreference aggregationCP-netsP-hardnesscombinatorial preferencesmCP-netsmax votingrank voting
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